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Abstract
The major implication from Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/PUU-
XI/2013 is that the Constitution promotes fundamental changes to the design of 
the general election regarding both process and substance. Therefore, in order 
to uphold the Constitution, efforts are required to reconstruct the design of the 
general election, particularly so that elections are conducted in accordance with 
Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013 as a representation of the spirit and the will of the 
1945 Constitution. Essentially, the current norm regarding the implementation 
of general elections following the election of members of the representative 
institution is not consistent with the stipulations in Article 22E Paragraph (1) and 
Paragraph (2) and Article 1 Paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution. Constitutional 
Court Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013 aims to realign the implementation of the 
elections with the intentions of the 1945 Constitution. Through implementation 
of the original intent method and systematic interpretation, the Constitutional 
Court offered its interpretation that the framers of the amended Constitution 
intended that general elections have five ballot boxes, with the first for the 
People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), the second 
for the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), the 
third for the president and vice president, the fourth for the Regional People’s 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) at the 
provincial level and the fifth for the DPRD at the regency level. Thus, it can be 
concluded that the presidential elections should be conducted simultaneously 
with elections of members of the representative bodies. Through this decision, 
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the Constitutional Court revoked the prevailing norm, such that Presidential 
Elections and Elections of members of representative bodies were no longer 
valid because they violated the 1945 Constitution. The Constitutional Court 
introduced a new legal condition that obligated General Elections to be held 
simultaneously.
Keywords: General Elections, Constitutional Court
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
If we are to accept that Constitutional Court decisions are manifestation of 
the constitution, then it follows that they should be upheld in the same way 
that the constitution itself is upheld. This concept is consistent with the doctrine 
of constitutional supremacy, which assures the constitution as the supreme 
law of the land. Therefore, the greatest and most important implication from 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013 is that the 1945 Constitution 
wills a foundational change to the design of the general elections as it has been 
implemented thus far.
Through Decision 14/PUU-XI/2013 on 23 January 2014, the Constitutional 
Court granted a petition to review the contents of Law No. 42, 2008 concerning 
Presidential and Vice-presidential General Election (Presidential Election 
Act). The petition was brought before the Court by the People’s Coalition for 
Simultaneous Elections. The Constitutional Court revoked Article 3 Paragraph 
(5), Article 12 Paragraphs (1) and (2), Article 14 Paragraph (2) and Article 112 
of the Presidential Election Act. These provisions regulated the conduct of 
the presidential and vice-presidential elections separately from the elections 
of members of the representative bodies. This was determined contrary to the 
Constitution concerning general elections, as regulated in Article 22E Paragraphs 
(1) and (2) and Article 1 Paragraph (2).
Through the original intent method and systematic interpretation as one 
of the bases for the decision, the Constitutional Court made the interpretation 
that the authors of the Constitution intended for an election of five ballot boxes 
with the first for the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 
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DPR), the second for The Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan 
Daerah, DPD), the third for the president and vice president, the fourth for the 
Regional People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, 
DPRD) at the provincial level and the fifth for the DPRD at the regency level. 
It can be understood, therefore, that the presidential elections should be held 
simultaneously the other elections of members of the representative bodies.
Through this decision, the Constitutional Court revoked the prevailing norm, 
such that Presidential Elections and Elections of Members of Representative Bodies 
were no longer valid because they violated the 1945 Constitution. However, this 
provision was not immediately implemented for the 2014 elections, but rather 
it was to be implemented from the 2019 elections and all elections thereafter.
Based on the description above, there are two things that need attention. 
First, the Constitutional Court decision must be implemented in the spirit of 
Decision as intended by the decision itself. Therefore, it is important to think 
about how the decision has been followed up on. If the addressee of Constitutional 
Court Decision No. 14 / PUU-XI / 2013 were the legislators, it is ‘homework’ for 
the legislators to formulate regulation within the legislation by reference to the 
Decision. Secondly, the implication supposes the first simultaneous elections 
in the context of the Indonesian political system and Indonesian democracy. 
Since the first elections in 1955 up to the 2014 general election, elections have 
never been conducted simultaneously, so that the country has absolutely no 
experience with such a system. If the election is understood as a long process 
beginning with the nomination stage and continuing through the campaigns, 
voting, determination of voting, dispute resolution, election results and finally 
ending with the determination of the election results, it is clear, in order to 
successfully hold elections simultaneously requires thorough preparation in all 
aspects, both regulation substance and technical administration, which requires 
effort and necessitates the participation of from components of the state.
These two points make this study both very urgent and interesting. The 
study is focused on two things, namely (1) the design of the electoral system 
for simultaneous elections, which includes the implementation of simultaneous 
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elections, the time of execution, the participants in the election, and the selection 
of the electoral system that is considered most appropriate and efficient; and (2) 
the mechanism for settling disputes over the results of simultaneous elections 
within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, which also includes a 
discussion of how the mechanism will be implemented, considering completion 
period, procedural law, and other technical matters. Thus, reflecting on the 
experience from previous elections, including the practical experience of several 
different countries in conducting simultaneous elections, is a very important 
part of this research.
B. Research Question
Based on the above, the problem is how to reconstruct the format of the 
general elections in light of Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/PUU-XI/2013?
II. DISCUSSION
A. Format of General Elections In Light of Constitutional Court Decision 
No. 14/PUU-XI/2013
1. Variants of Simultaneous Elections
Simultaneous elections can be simply defined as an electoral system 
that conducts multiple elections at one time simultaneously.1 These elections 
include executive and legislative elections from the national, regional and 
local levels. In the member countries of the European Union, simultaneous 
elections even include elections at the supra-national level, namely the 
European parliamentary elections, which are held concurrently with the 
national regional and local elections. With the variety of factors affecting the 
implementation of simultaneous elections, there are several variants, some of 
which have already been implemented and some that are still hypothetical. 
A simultaneous electoral system has been applied in many democracies; not 
only those countries who have long implemented a democratic system, such 
as the United States and some Western European countries,2 but also many 
1  Benny Geys, Explaining Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate-Level Research, Electoral Studies 25 (2006): 652.  
2 David J. Andersen, Pushing the Limits of Democracy: Concurrent Elections and Cognitive Limitations of Voters. PhD Dissertation, (New 
Jersey: The State University of New Jersey, 2011). See also Benny Geys, ―Explaining Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate-Level 
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relatively younger democracies, such as those in Latin America3, and Eastern 
Europe4. However in Southeast Asia, the simultaneous electoral system is not 
yet widely known. Of the five countries that implement election—though not 
entirely democratic—only The Philippines conduct simultaneous elections 
for elections of the president and legislators, while Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Thailand do not use simultaneous elections.5
In the implementation of simultaneous elections, executive elections have 
commonly been combined with legislative elections. In Latin America, Jones 
noted that presidential and legislative elections are conducted simultaneously 
in Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela. In some countries, simultaneous 
elections also combine national and regional or local elections. In the United 
States, for example, some states incorporate not only the presidential election 
and members of Congress and the Senate at the central level, but at the 
same time also hold elections for governors and legislators at the state level.6 
In Latin America, Brazil also implements a similar model. Elections are 
conducted simultaneously by combining the presidential and parliamentary 
elections at the national level, and elections for governors and legislators 
at the state level.7
Variants of simultaneous elections can be distinguished by the 
implementation time and the level of government that can affect voters’ 
perceptions of the importance of the elections. Theoretically, the holding 
of multiple elections at the same time—such as legislative elections with 
presidential elections, legislative elections with a referendum on public 
Research, Electoral Studies 25 (2006): 637-663.  
3 David Samuels, ―Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil, Comparative 
Political Studies 33 (1): 1-20.  
4 Tatiana Kostadinova and Timothy J. Power, ―Does Democratization Depress Participation? Voter Turnout in the Latin American 
and Eastern European Transitional Democracies, Political Research Quarterly 60 (3) 2007: 363-377. See also Thomas Sedelius, The 
Tug-of-War between Presidents and Prime Ministers: Semi Presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe, (Orebro University: Orebro 
Studies in Political Science 15, 2006).  
5 Schraufnagel, Scott, Michael Buehler, dan Maureen Lowry-Fritz, ―Voter Turnout in Democratizing Southeast Asia: A Comparative 
Analysis of Electoral Participation in Five Countries, Taiwan Journal of Democracy 10 (1) 2014: 1-22.  
6 David J. Andersen, Pushing the Limits of Democracy: Concurrent Elections and Cognitive Limitations of Voters. PhD Dissertation, (New 
Jersey: The State University of New Jersey, 2011). See also Benny Geys, ―Explaining Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate-Level 
Research, Electoral Studies 25 (2006): 2.
7 David Samuels, ―Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil, Comparative 
Political Studies 33 (1): 1-20.  
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issues, as well as all sorts of elections for public positions and important 
policy issues—is usually closely linked to the electoral cycle, mechanical 
effect utilities of the election, oppressive regimes, and also the existing party 
model. Elections might be held simultaneously if the fixed terms for multiple 
political offices coincide, so that at certain times elections will be held in 
unison for a variety of public positions even though the respective term of 
office for each position is different. An example of this is in America, where 
the president’s term is four year, senators’ six years, and board members two 
years. The term of office for public positions at the state level, districts, and 
cities are also similar to those applied in the federal government so that 
simultaneous elections occur in cycles that can affect political constellation. 
However, simultaneous elections can also be held when the government gets 
a parliamentary no-confidence motion and must hold an election to fill a 
public office at the national or regional level.8
Simultaneous elections can also be designed such that one election has 
an impact on another election. Usually the consideration is to influence 
the outcome of the presidential election with the results of legislative 
elections as a basis for determining the winner. Under certain rules, it is 
possible to influence the vote a particular party on the condition that the 
party’s presidential candidate wins, so that one type of election will have 
a mechanical effect on the results of other elections. The party with the 
most votes, it can deliver the presidential candidates for the presidency even 
though the result in the presidential election is not necessarily the best 
result. In some variants, mechanistic effects are expected to occur within 
a certain timeframe, which is commonly referred to as the coattail effect. 
For example, legislative and presidential elections are expected to affect the 
outcome of mid-term elections, or elections to be held thereafter. In the 
context of Indonesia, based on empirical and hypothetical variants, there are 
at least six models of simultaneous elections. First, simultaneous elections 
held once every five years for all public positions at the national level down 
8  Electoral Research Institute – LIPI, 2014, Position Paper Pemilu Nasional Serentak 2019, Jakarta, page: 18-19 (www.eri-indonesia.
org) access on Oktober 2015
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to the district/city level. This election includes the election of the legislature 
(DPR, DPD, Provincial and District/City), the presidential election, and the 
local leaders election. It is often called seven box election or bulk election. 
Second, simultaneous elections for legislative positions only (central and 
local), followed by the simultaneous elections for executive positions (central 
and local). In this clustered simultaneous model, DPR, DPD, Provincial and 
District/City elections are implemented at the same and are then followed 
by the presidential election and elections for the governor and regent/mayor 
a few months later.9
Third, simultaneous elections with by-election based on government level, 
where the national elections and local elections are separated (simultaneous 
election concurrent with mid-term election). In this model DPR and DPD 
elections are concurrent with the presidential election, and the elections of 
Province and district/city councils are concurrent with elections for governors 
and regents/mayors two or three years after the general elections. Fourth, 
simultaneous elections at the national and local levels that are distinguished 
by intervals of time (simultaneous election with regionally-based simultaneous 
elections). In this model, the presidential election and the legislative elections 
for the DPR and DPD are conducted at the same time. Then in the second 
year the local level simultaneously holds elections to choose the provincial 
and Regency/City DPRD and as well as the election of Governor and Regent/
Mayor by grouping certain regions or island areas. For example the second 
year on the island of Sumatra, the third year for the island of Java, and the 
fourth year for Bali and Kalimantan, and the fifth year for the remaining 
areas. With this model, every year all parties have to work to gain voter 
support, and the government and political parties can be evaluated by voters 
annually. Fifth is simultaneous national elections followed by simultaneous 
elections in each province at an agreed time or based on the local election 
cycle in their respective provinces. This model, simultaneous elections with 
flexible simultaneous local elections, the Presidential election is combined 
9  Electoral Research Institute – LIPI, 2014, Position Paper Pemilu Nasional Serentak 2019, Jakarta, page: 19-20 (www.eri-indonesia.
org) access on Oktober 2015
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with the legislative elections for the DPR and DPD. Then after that depends 
on the local elections cycle schedule for simultaneous elections at the local 
level to choose governors, regents, and mayors as well as select members of 
the Provincial DPRD and Regency/City, and later followed by simultaneous 
elections in the same locale across other provinces, such that in one year 
there could be several simultaneous local elections in certain provinces.10
Sixth, are simultaneous elections for members of the DPR, DPD and 
DPRD as well as the President and Vice-President, followed after a certain time 
interval by simultaneous elections for the province. In this election, the local 
level simultaneous elections are for selecting governors, regents and mayors 
simultaneously in a province, and the schedule depends on the agreed cycle 
of local elections in each province. In the first, second, and third models, 
if the goal of simultaneous elections is simply cost saving, it has certainly 
been achieved. However, the administration of the elections becomes more 
complex; the political configuration becomes erratic; it may even result in 
obscured political blocking and encourage transactional politics because of 
the need for electoral support to win the election. On the other hand, the 
simultaneous elections in the third, fourth, and fifth models is believed to 
make the electoral system more simple. With the concurrent implementation 
of elections for members of Parliament and for the president, the tendency is 
that there are only two major blocks of a coalition of political parties, which 
both nominate presidential and vice presidential candidates. Blocking politics 
created by the executive and legislative election results at the national level 
are likely also to manifest itself also in the region. If the national elections 
provide good results from the president and the legislative members, then 
voters will also choose a partner and regional head of Parliament from the 
candidate of the governing parties of national elections. Thus congruence be 
created not only in the executive–legislative level, but also central and local.11
10  Electoral Research Institute – LIPI, 2014, Position Paper Pemilu Nasional Serentak 2019, Jakarta, page: 19-20 (www.eri-indonesia.
org) access on Oktober 2015
11  Electoral Research Institute – LIPI, 2014, Position Paper Pemilu Nasional Serentak 2019, Jakarta, page: 20-21 (www.eri-indonesia.
org) access on Oktober 2015
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2. Time of Execution of Simultaneous Elections
When referring to the norms of simultaneous election administration, 
the Constitutional Court decision refers to Article 22E Paragraph (1) of 
the 1945 Constitution, which states, “The general election is held directly, 
public, free, confidential, honest, and fair once in every five years “. It is 
understood that the constitution mandates that there is only one election 
in five years. This is immediately followed by Paragraph (2) stating, “The 
elections are held to elect members of the House of Representatives, Regional 
Representatives Council, the President and the Vice President and the 
Regional Representatives Council.” It is understood, therefore, that the direct, 
public, free, confidential, honest, and fair elections held once every five years 
are intended to elect members of the House of Representatives, Regional 
Representatives Council, the President and the Vice President and the House 
of Representatives Area all at one time, simultaneously. However, the argument 
for a five-box simultaneous election has drawn criticism for several reasons:12
a) Lack of Coattail Effect
The desire to strengthen the presidential system brings about a mutually 
supportive relationship between the executive and the legislature, thus 
creating strong governance. This is not so easy to create if all five 
elections are administered simultaneously because the separate ballot 
papers allow voters to make inconsistent choices. Voters may vote for 
a party A to the legislature, and party B’s candidate for president; thus 
there is no coattail effect.
b) The Possibility of W
So far in Indonesia’s experience holding elections, it can be seen that 
voter behaviour in Indonesia is still heavily influenced by campaign 
materials or affiliation with potential proximity reasons, for example 
because of shared ethnicity, physical performance or other such instant 
factors. Therefore, based on recent elections in Indonesia, there have 
been many cases of money politics, but new jargon has developed 
12  Electoral Research Institute – LIPI, 2014, Position Paper Pemilu Nasional Serentak 2019, Jakarta, page: 103 (www.eri-indonesia.org) 
access on Oktober 2015
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within the community, creating a perception that such cases are normal 
and not problematic. As such, there must be engineered an electoral 
management and a tightening of legal sanctions for those involved in 
money politics. Provisions in the electoral law that prohibit giving, 
receiving or promising goods and services during the elections need to 
be enforced. In addition, the voters’ ability to make rational, informed 
decisions based on the parties’s programmes is minimal. Parties fail to 
socialise their programmes to prospective voters and candidates efforts 
to drive the success of their respective party programmes are weak. 
Hence the necessity for a formula to systemically to address the issue.
c) Security Factors
In recent experience of legislative elections held simultaneously 
nationwide, there have not been any high security risks. However, it 
should be noted that the escalation of friction amongst supporters during 
contestation of the legislative elections and the presidential elections are 
significantly different. For example, because there were only two pairs 
of candidates in the 2014 presidential elections, the friction between 
supporters of each candidate was considerable, which has implications 
for public security. If five elections are combined into one simultaneous 
election, then the question of security is necessary to draw greater 
attention due to the potential compounding of friction amongst the 
supporters of different presidential candidates with the interests of the 
supporters of contesting parties.
d) Logistical Arrangements
Thus far, logistic arrangements have used a centralised logistics and 
distribution system to implement zoning with enforced zones arranged in 
a way to get closer to the winning bidder’s plant and logistics distribution 
area. With simultaneous elections across diverse regions, it remains to be 
seen whether the election organisers (KPU) will apply the same systems 
and mechanisms or find a new approach. The complexity of a five-way 
simultaneous election requires more thoroughness from the organisers.
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Thus, a national-local model for simultaneous elections has been 
proposed, which must pay consideration to the following:
a. the end-of-term for the president, DPR and DPD for the national 
elections;
b. the end-of-term for the governor, regent/mayor, provincial DPRD and 
district/municipal DPRD for the local elections. 
Historically, the president and vice president have been inaugurated on 
20 October, and the DPR and DPD are inaugurated on 1 October. Since the 
legislative elections are held on the 9 April, the time between the election 
and the inauguration is 5 or 6 month, which allows for the emergence of 
ineffective legislation, particularly for those who are not reelected. Therefore, 
if there is to be a simultaneous election, it is best if the time between the 
election and the inauguration is reduced, though with consideration to the 
time needed for recapitulation, which is one month, as well as the time 
needed for the settlement of claims with the  Constitutional Court. In light 
of these matters, May 2019 was suggested as an appropriate time for the first 
simultaneous national election because it does not interfere with the ending 
of the president’s term. If local simultaneous elections are to follow two 
and a half years later, then they will be held in November 2021. Regarding 
budgeting responsibilities, finances can be accounted for in December.
3. Possible Systems for Simultaneous Elections
Systems in this case refer to the procedures involved involved in 
conducting a simultaneous election, consisting of the mechanism and 
procedures for directly electing the president and vice president and for 
electing the members of the DPR and DPD. Procedures for local elections 
are not considered a part of the national system. The national system is 
concerned with how the presidential and vice presidential candidates as well 
as candidates for the DPR and DPD will be elected directly by the people. 
Meanwhile, the choosing of presidential and vice presidential candidate will 
not experience a change of system. The system for electing the president 
and vice president is a plurality system, not a majority system (50% + 1), as 
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regulated by the Constitution. Meanwhile, the Multi-member district system 
is used to elect members of the DPD for each region, whereby multiple 
members are chosen based on the top largest votes relative to the number 
of chairs available, e.g. for regions with three chairs, the top three candidates 
with most votes in that region are elected.
As for selecting candidates for members of DPR, there are two main 
types of system available, namely, proportional and majoritarian. Some 
countries have developed from these two systems a mixed system that 
combines the two mechanisms. In the context of simultaneous elections, 
this option requires that there be a presidential coattail and political efficacy, 
such that the choice of candidates for president / vice president will have 
an impact on the choice of a political party or candidates for Parliament 
nominated by political parties. The presidential coattail effect and political 
efficacy, can be influenced by whether the choice of candidate for president/
vice-president and for members of DPR/parties are on a single ballot paper 
or separate ballot papers. Although there are different mandates for each, 
preventing them from being combined as one, some countries unite the 
electoral process in a single ballot nonetheless. Aside from efficiency, this 
is done in the context of simultaneous elections in order to magnify the 
impact of the presidential and vice-presidential election on the election of 
party members and members of DPR/parties.13
However, the technical implementation must also be considered in 
order to find the electoral system that is most convenient. Furthermore, the 
system should be tailored to the specific goals, particularly regarding efforts 
to realise a simple multi-party system. To that end, there are several options 
for combining systems with technical implementation. First, continue to use 
the open proportional system (Open PR) to elect the members of the DPR. 
The advantages of using Open PR include reducing party oligarchy in the 
recruitment and nomination of members of Parliament and allowing voters 
to vote for representatives directly. However drawbacks are that the political 
13  Electoral Research Institute – LIPI, 2014, Position Paper Pemilu Nasional Serentak 2019, Jakarta, page: 71-72 (www.eri-indonesia.
org) access on Oktober 2015
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parties lose control over the candidates for the people’s representatives, the 
widespread use of money politics in the search for support, the unhealthy 
intra-party and inter-party competition and pencurian suara antarkandidat. 
Regarding technical implementation, voters are given the opportunity to 
elect a party and/or to select individual candidates from an open list. In 
practice, voters are often confused when selecting a candidate as there are 
so many to choose from. Often many voters who do not have an individual 
preference end up choosing a political party rather than choosing candidates. 
In a simultaneous election, the use of an open proportional system is 
technically very difficult to combine on one ballot paper the prospective 
presidential/vice-president with the open list of candidates and political 
parties. Consequently, if the open PR system is used, there will still be 
three boxes in the administration simultaneous elections, namely box 1 the 
presidential/vice-presidential candidate; box 2 for members of Parliament/
political parties; and box 3 for members of the DPD.
The second option is a closed proportional system, though this can be 
considered a step backwards. Nevertheless, there has not been any evaluation 
using the Open PR system of how many voters opt to elect a party rather 
than an individual candidate. At a glance, results from polling stations 
suggest that there is still a tendency towards voters choosing a party rather 
than selecting from the open list of candidates. The effectiveness of using 
an Open PR system, as well as the shortcomings mentioned above, is not 
yet an option for voters. If the Closed PR system is used, the elections can 
be conducted more efficiently, and the effects of presidential coattail and 
political efficacy will be significantly higher because the voters can directly 
compare the presidential/vice-presidential candidates with the political 
parties upon the same ballot paper. With the presidential/vice-presidential 
candidates placed so close to the party logos, the coattail effect will be much 
higher than with two separate papers. 
A third option is holding simultaneous elections at the same time by 
changing the system of parliamentary/party elections from a proportional 
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electoral system to a mixed system, specifically a parallel election. This 
is a valid option, considering the trials conducted by the LIPI Political 
Research Centre (P2P LIPI) on the effectiveness of the parallel electoral 
system to produce a moderate multiparty system. The results of simulations 
conducted by P2P LIPI based on data from the 2009 and 2014 Elections 
showed acceleration in producing a moderate political party composition 
(moderate) in parliament without parliamentary threshold. The parallel 
electoral system is a system where most members of the DPR are elected 
through a proportional system (closed) and others are selected through a 
majoritarian system.
In the context of technical administration, it is more feasible to 
conduct a simultaneous presidential and vice-presidential elections with a 
parallel electoral system using a single ballot paper rather than the Open 
PR system. Tingkat kemungkinan teknis penyelenggaraanya hampir sama 
dengan simultaneous elections combining the plurality system with closed 
lists and/or parallel election, because each party only presents the party logo 
and a single name for a majoritarian election. Thus, it is technically easier 
to implement than the open list, which would require three ballot papers, 
while the combination of closed list and parallel system requires only two 
papers: one for the president/vice-president and the party/candidate and one 
for members of the DPD. One major benefit of the parallel election is that 
it solves the problem of spread results in a proportional system caused by 
a fragmented multiparty system. From the three variants offered, this paper 
suggests a change in the system used for electing members of DPR in order 
to realise the goal of simplifying the multiparty system.
4. Settlement of Disputes in Light of Constitutional Court Decision No. 
14/PUU-XI/2013
a. Violations and Disputes
In matters of election law, we can refer to Law No. 8, 2012 concerning 
General Elections for Members of the People’s Representative Council, 
Regional Representative Council and Regional People’s Representative 
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Council because it is more complete than Law No. 42, 2008 concerning 
General Election for the President and Vice-president, Law No. 15, 
2011 concerning Administration of General Elections and Government 
Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1, 2014 regarding Elections for Governer, 
Regent and Mayor. Law No. 8/2012 recognises two legal problems: 
violations and disputes. Violations refers to criminal acts related to general 
elections, and disputes refers to electoral disputes, and disputes over the 
administration of elections and results of elections. There are three kinds 
of election violations: Electoral violations are misdemeanours or felonies 
under electoral law. Unlike the laws before, Law No. 8/2012 differentiates 
between misdemeanours and felonies. Said Law determines19 articles of 
misdemeanours, from giving false information on the electoral roll to 
announcing survey results during the cooling–off period. There are also 
29 articles of felonies determined by Law 8/2012, including depriving 
another of the right to vote to election officials not taking action or 
reporting when discovering violations.
Electoral administration violations are violations that relate to the 
methods, procedures and mechanisms in each stage of the election 
other than violations of the electoral administration code of ethics. 
Because these violations are related to the administration of elections, 
they constitute violations of KPU regulations. Law No. 8/2012 does not 
specify the type or form of sanctions for such violations. Sanctions 
are directly related to the administration process, starting from verbal 
warning, written warning to revocation of position as a voter or candidate.
Violations of the election administration code of ethics are violations 
of the ethics of election administration in accordance with the oaths 
taken before the commencement of the elections. According to Law 
No. 15/2011, the election administration code of ethics is compiled and 
implemented by the DKPP with a view to protecting the independence, 
integrity and credibility of the administration of elections. Penalties 
for violators of the election administration code of ethics of consist of 
written warning, suspension, and permanent dismissal. There are also 
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three types of electoral dispute: Disputes amongst participants of the 
election and disputes between participants and administrators of the 
election as a result of decisions issued by KPU at the national, provincial 
or regency/city level. According to Law No. 15/2011, in the administration 
of elections, KPU at the national level can issue KPU Regulations and 
KPU Decisions, while KPU at the province and lower levels can issue 
decisions with reference to the KPU at the national level. Regarding 
legislative elections, there have been many decisions issued by KPU at 
all levels, consistent with the procedures and stages of administering 
the elections, and all of which are results of disputes, whether amongst 
participants or between participants and administrators.
State administrative electoral disputes arise between candidates for 
members of DPR, DPD, DPRD and parties on the one hand and KPU 
on the other as a result of decisions issued by KPU. These disputes arise 
when a party candidate does not pass verification as a result of a KPU 
Decision concerning the determination of participant political parties; 
and a candidate for membership to the DPR, DPD or DPRD is stricken 
from the candidate list as a result of a KPU Decision concerning the 
determination of the candidate list. Disputes over election results arise 
between KPU and the participants regarding the national determination 
of votes. Disputes over the determination of votes in the national election 
may affect the number of seats for participants of the election. The 
Constitution affirms that such disputes are handled by the Constitutional 
Court. Originally, disputes over regional election results were also 
addressed the Constitutional Court, but recently a Constitutional Court 
Decision handed these cases off to the Supreme Court.
III. CONCLUSION 
A. Summary
The format of the election after Constitutional Court Decision No. 14/
PUU-XI/2013 is a five-box election, where box 1 is for the DPR, box 2 is 
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for the DPD, box 3 is for the president and vice-president, box 4 is the 
DPRD at the province level, and box 5 is for the DPRD at the regency/city 
level and is conducted simultaneously. Aside from changes to the time of 
administration, there are also changes to the candidacy system, electoral 
system, campaign models and the election area and presidential threshold 
in simultaneous elections.
B. Recommendations
1. All stakeholders in the simultaneous elections—the government, 
DPR, DPD, administrators—must share a common understanding of 
simultaneous elections;
2. This shared understanding will ease the formulation of laws for the 
simultaneous national general elections for president/vice-president, 
members of DPR and DPD and for the local simultaneous general 
elections for Governer and DPRD at the province level and Regent and 
Regency DPRD as well as Mayor and City DPRD;
3. At least two laws pertaining to simultaneous elections must be made:
i. law on Simultaneous National General Elections;
ii. amendment to the law on General Elections for Regional Leaders to 
cover Simultaneous Local General Elections at the Provincial Level.
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